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Abstract
Purpose - The purpose of this study is to obtain insights into the systems of accountability
within a company set up by the Lau provincial council in Fiji. It is the only company set up
by any of the fourteen provincial councils in Fiji to be consistently profitable. Yet the study
reveals poor accountability has prevailed within the company and by the company to its
shareholders. This has led to the company generating fewer benefits to its shareholders and
the province of Lau in general than would have been obtained with appropriate
accountabilities in place.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper explicates the system of accountability by case
studying a Fiji provincial company. An in-depth case study was undertaken on the Lau
provincial company, in order to analyse its system of accountability. Data was collected
through content analysis of the annual reports and other information available in the public
domain. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the company executives and other
stakeholders of the company.
Findings - The study provides insights into the systems of accountability practised by the
Lau provincial company and provided to the grassroots provincial population. Analysis of
the entity studied revealed accountability has been influenced by the power distance in
society, high levels of trust placed on those in authority, the culture of respect and silence,
and the lack of attention to detail and planning. This has resulted in weak accountabilities
being provided to the provincial population and hence, the need to consider exploring
‘intelligent’ forms of accountability (Roberts, 2009) for the provincial population.
Originality/value – This paper makes reference to Gelfand et al. (2004), in which they
develop a framework to analyse accountability in a cultural context. This study is the first to
employ their framework in a society from a developing economy, with a culture
significantly different from that found in western developed economies where the bulk of
research on issues of accountability has been undertaken. Contexts in which accountability
is discharged, which Gelfand et al. acknowledge may exist, but do not explore are
identified. All fourteen provinces have set up companies to engage in their respective
provinces’ economic development. This offers opportunities for future research, together
with additional analysis on the cultural configuration of indigenous Fijian societies and their
corresponding accountability system.
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1. Introduction
“From the most primitive tribal systems to loosely structured alliances to the most
sophisticated production systems, social systems of any sort demand, at some level,
general agreement about expectations and rules guiding behaviour…social systems
can be defined in terms of shared expectations…Thus, accountability is at the root of
viable social systems, and all the more so in formal organisations.” (Frink and
Klimoski, 2004, p. 2)

Accountability is a “distinctive and universal feature of any social system” (Bracci, 2009, p.
294) and is essential for the maintenance of any social system (Gelfand et al., 2004).
However, it is also recognized that the idea of accountability is elusive (Sinclair, 1995) and
“notoriously difficult to pin-down”(McKernan and McPhail 2012, p. 177). Roberts and
Scapens (1985) laid out the widely understood explanation of accountability as “the giving
and demanding of reasons for conduct” (p.447). Such an understanding of accountability
could result in accountability being “framed in the context of reporting mechanisms only”
(Smyth, 2012, p 231).
It is recognized that accountability is grounded in ‘calculation’ and ‘discourse and
narrative’(McKernan and McPhail 2012, p. 177). As currently understood the “calculative
face of accountability has been dominant” (ibid) and the ‘discourse and narrative’ mode of
accountability “is consistently undervalued and often suppressed in theory and practice”
(Boland and Schultze 1996, as cited from McKernan and McPhail 2012, p. 177).
Gelfand et al. (2004, p.136) argues that much of the theory and research of
accountability in organisations has focused almost exclusively on Western contexts such as
United States and Western Europe in the context of agency theory, focusing on the principal
agent relationship. Gelfand et al. recognise the potential for mutual accountability and
influence in a given setting, allowing them to arrive at the following definition of
accountability,“the perception of being answerable for actions and decisions, in accordance with
interpersonal, social, and structural contingencies, all of which are embedded in
particular sociocultural contexts” (p.137).
Gelfand et al. then develop the cultural accountability configurations positing how
characteristics of accountability are influenced by the dominant cultural dimensions [1] in a
particular society. The high power distance that exists between the indigenous Fijian chiefs
and the indigenous population and the communal cultural values of indigenous Fijian
society (see Davie, 2007; Rika et al., 2008) make Gelfand et al.’s definition of
accountability and theoretical framework, an appropriate tool to analyse accountability in
Fiji’s provincial companies.
In this paper we set out to contribute to this stream of literature on the limitations of
calculative accountability to the grassroots and utilizing Gelfand et al. We consider the
accountability configurations in play in an indigenously owned provincial company and
argue that they differ from the configurations that will yield appropriate accountability in
the prevailing culture.
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The balance of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the background
information on Fiji’s provincial councils and companies, specifically the case studied
province and company. Section 3 sets out a review of the literature and the theoretical
background of cultural accountability configurations (Gelfand et al., 2004). Section 4
explains the research issue and methodology. The findings with respect to the
accountabilities within the Lau provincial company are presented in section 5. Finally,
section 6 provides a discussion of the findings and offers some concluding comments.
2. Fiji’s Provincial Councils and Companies: an overview
Subsequent to annexing Fiji in 1874, Britain established fourteen provinces as
administrative units installing chiefs as Roko (provincial governor) or Buli (district chiefs)
among the indigenous population to maintain an orderly society, training them as provincial
administrators (Durutalo, 1997). Each province has their provincial administrative office
staffed by the iTaukei Affairs Board[2] (TAB) and a provincial council, which comprises of
provincial chiefs and elected representatives from the province[3].This entrenched a
hierarchical authoritarian social system, where orders filtered from the apex to the base and
obedience, with allegiance filtered back from the base to the apex (Durutalo, 1997, p. 7).
The chiefs were elevated to greater status and authority in 1945 during the
reorganization of the Fijian Administration, which gave leading chiefs almost full command
over Fijian affairs (Norton, 2002). This strengthened their authority as provincial/district
administrators, and established the chiefly authority as an autonomous body within the
government of Fiji. The chiefly bureaucratic and political elite were projected as the
guardians of indigenous Fijian identity, culture and economic benefits in the face of the
growing Indian population[4] (Durutalo, op cit., p. 138; Norton, 2002, p. 108). The
reinforcement of the chiefly hegemony through the creation of provincial councils created a
recognised political and social aristocracy within the indigenous Fijian community (Davie
2005, p. 522), which served to establish them as a group where authority is above question.
Such institutions became part of indigenous Fijian social structure and in 2002 when a
government commissioned committee made recommendations to restructure such
institutions this was “out-rightly rejected by the indigenous Fijian political elites who
wanted to maintain the neo-colonial order” (Ratuva 2005, p. 9). While the influence of this
aristocracy has been eroded at the national level by the coup d'état of 2006, chiefs are still
highly influential in provincial affairs (see Rika et al., 2008).
Provincial councils are provided with limited central government finance a levy is also
imposed on indigenous adult males to help meet their provincial administrative office
operating costs. This is payable whether an individual lives in their province of origin or
not. In practice the burden of meeting the levy falls on those actually living in the province,
collecting the levies from ‘expatriates’ proving to be virtually impossible. In Lau’s case this
can be particularly serious for the resident population, as the vast majority of its members
live out of the province.
The provincial councils’ role has evolved from provincial administration to one of
facilitating indigenous Fijian participation in commerce with the establishment of one, or
more, provincial companies to operate as their commercial arm to contribute to their
provinces’ economic development. Provincial chiefs have typically taken a key role in
establishing these companies and in some cases assuming roles as company executives. In
conventional terms, these companies have not been a success, with such companies typically
reporting losses (Qalo, 1984; Ratuva, 2002).
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This paper case studies the Lau provincial company, which would appear to be the
stand out exception, having reported profits in all years since its inception. The Lau
provincial company was established in October 1971 at the instigation of the province’s
paramount chief at that time[5], who established the company with the financial assistance
of the province, to operate as an investment vehicle Instead of investing in economic
activities within the province the company holds assets on Fiji’s mainland where far more
investment opportunities are available. These include investments in financial and real
assets, including hotels and a tourist facility[6].
2.1 Background on the Lau Province
The Lau group of islands lie in an arc some 150 to 200 miles east of Viti Levu, the main
island of Fiji, and about 300 miles north-west of Tonga (Hooper, 1982). The Lau province
comprises of fifty seven islands totalling around 490 square kilometres of which only 19
islands are inhabited, with a population of around 10,700 people living in the Lau islands
and 57,485 Lauans[7] residing outside of Lau
(http://www.statsfiji.gov.fj/Census2007/census07_index2.htm).
Hooper (1982) explains that an understanding of the Lauan notion of chieftainship is
essential to an understanding of Lauan society as a whole.
“The chiefdom of Lau has been an integrated unit under the authority of the paramount
chief (Sau ni Vanua ko Lau) since the late eighteenth century… and recognize the
authority of the Sau ni Vanua ko Lau[8] and participate in enterprises which he
sponsors…” (Hooper, 1982, p. 47)
The Lau province has 13 districts (Tikina) and 72 villages. Each Tikina will have a
number of villages and each village is further divided into Mataqali(s) (clans) and the
Mataqali is further divided into Tokatoka(s) (extended family units). Each Tikina have their
own chief and so does each village, however, the paramount chief for the Lau province is
known as the Sau ni Vanua ko Lau.
Hooper (1982) explained that “…membership of exogamous clans is in most cases
determined by patrilineal descent; children are born as members of their father’s clan…” (p.
26). Hooper (ibid) in describing the interactions of groups of people in Lau noted that
“Honour and respect for elders is one of the fundamental codes of Lauan life and
this is reflected in allowing precedence to elders, and especially to those who are
leaders of their clans…this comes about naturally…” (p. 31)
“Forms of respect for the paramount chief are most marked, since he is the highest
authority in the chiefdom of Lau…all minor chiefdoms recognize the authority of the
paramount chief, the Sau ni Vanua, who resides at Tubou, Lakeba.” (p. 46)
Hooper (ibid, p. 33) further noted that it is not his intention to create an impression that
“…Lauan social life is restricted and rule-bound…”, however, these “…are social
graces that are learnt by all members of this society from childhood and their
implementation is part of the natural flow of things…”
“It is not a restricting convenience but an almost instinctive and therefore
comfortable aspect of life.”
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2.2 Background on the Lau Provincial Company
The Lau provincial company was established in December, 1971 at the instigation of the
late paramount chief of Lau who was also the chair of the Lau Provincial Council. He
Chaired the Board of Directors at the company’s inception until his death in 2008 and has
been succeeded by his daughter, who also enjoys high chiefly status.
In the company’s annual reports (2007-2009) the vision articulated is to “aspire to
become one of Fiji’s most successful investment companies” with a mission statement to be
“...the preferred investment choice for the people of Lau”. In the initial interviews with the
company’s chief executive officer (CEO), he explained
“…the company was established to uplift the quality of life of the province, as the
Lau province was isolated in comparison to other provinces in Fiji” (Interview
Transcript, CEO 2009)
The Lau provincial company’s share capital has been raised in a number of ways. It is
by no means clear that shares have been assigned consistent with the contributions made by
investors. The provincial council may have drawn on the levy in accumulating funds to
provide equity for the company. Equity was certainly raised through communal fundraising
activities and from statutory deductions, made from cash flows accruing to copra growers
and communally owned plantations. The Lau provincial council holds shares in the
provincial company in its own right. Financial contributions to the council’s funds would
have facilitated this investment. However sufficient capital could not be raised within the
province to sustain planned business activity. The provincial council itself made capital
injections into the company by utilising an annual government grant of $100,000 provided
under a government funded Development Assistance Scheme (DAS). Instead of using these
monies to fund village projects, villages were allocated shares in the company. Until the
paramount chief’s death in 2008 dividends accruing on shares held by the council were
directly reinvested in the company. Dividends on all communally held shares have also been
reinvested as a matter of course, in line with direction from the Paramount Chief and chair
of the company’s board. Additionally, a number of shares are held by individuals from the
Lau province.
Since 2007 additional capital has also been obtained from issuing ‘B’ class shares to
Fiji’s population at large. ‘A’ and ‘B’ class shareholders have identical rights to dividends,
but B class shareholders have no voting rights and are restricted to a single representative on
the Board of Directors. The Lau provincial company has operated primarily as an
investment vehicle.
The company has twelve members in its Board of Directors[9], which is the maximum
number of Directors as noted in the company’s Articles of Association and the selection of
the Board members as explained by the CEO is as follows
“Two Directors have like automatic seats which is part of the company’s Articles of
Association, which provides that a male and female heir of the founder get direct
seats, and the Lau Provincial Council has a seat, than the second largest
shareholder gets a seat, also two female directors chosen by the area they represent
but elected at the AGM. B Class Director is nominated by the Board and approved
at the AGM, so what has happened in the past is the larger Class B shareholders
have put up names, this goes through the Board and Board nominates who to the
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AGM. The rest of the Board of Directors are elected at the AGM by the
shareholders” …” (CEO Interview Transcript, 2008)
The Lau provincial company offices are located in Suva, Fiji’s capital, and its annual
general meetings are held at the company owned hotel there. While there are practical
reasons for this, attendance at the annual general meeting (AGM) becomes prohibitively
expensive for shareholders living in Lau. Shareholders attending the AGM are typically
‘Lauan expatriates’, who may serve as proxies for the communal shareholding of their
village of origin.
Company representatives seek to ensure contact with its ‘A’ class shareholders by
accompanying provincial council officers on liaison visits to the island communities and to
meet with Lauans now living in Fiji’s mainland. It was at such a meeting that Lauans
residing on the mainland raised the following issue,“…….if the assets strength of the company is over $32 million, why is the province
facing the greatest challenge of transporting people and cargo in and out of the
island?” (Provincial Council office Annual Report 2009)
The company’s CEO response was,“…the company has no intention of going into shipping business and also the board
does not approve of this business venture…” (Provincial Council office Annual
Report 2009)
The company’s finance manager has also reiterated,“…….we do not have any interest at the moment of providing non- economic returns
to the province. We definitely will not go into shipping. On a social corporate
responsibility side we probably will look at some projects to assist the province with
other partner donors, probably in two years’ time.”(Finance Manager Interview
Transcript, 2011)

3. Accountability: review of the literature
Accountability systems have always been fundamental for the survival and functioning of
social systems (Bracci, 2009; Gelfand et al., 2004). This is as systems of accountability use
devices of control to reduce the variability of human behaviour and produce stable patterns
of activity (Gelfand et al., 2004). Hence, not only does accountability serve as a way to
achieve external legitimation but also fosters effective functioning within societies (Gelfand
et al., 2004). As reflected by Roberts (1991) accountability processes reflect
interdependence within social relationships.
Accountability is a “distinctive and universal feature of any social system” (Bracci,
2009, p. 294) and is essential to the maintenance of a social system (Gelfand, et al., 2004).
This is as social systems maintain order and coordination between individuals, by creating
standards to which individuals and groups are answerable, and to which entities are judged
and sanctioned (Schlenker and Weigold, 1989; as cited in Gelfand et al., 2004). It is systems
of accountability that provide such moral order, creating a complex system of reciprocal
rights and obligations (Roberts and Scapens, 1985). Involving monitoring, evaluation and
control of organizational agents to ensure they behave in the interests of the shareholders
and other stakeholders (Keasey & Wright, 1993). It is in systems of accountability that
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individuals, groups and organizations, behaviours, results and experiences are made visible
and intelligible to others. This produces an organisation which is more cohesive and
coherent (Bracci, 2009; Llewellyn, 1994).
Accountability, according to Boland and Schultze (1996, p. 62) “…is the capacity and
willingness to give explanations for conduct, stating how one has discharged one’s
responsibility’. Similarly, Broadbent and Laughlin (2003, p. 24) referred to accountability as
“associated with giving reasons for conduct for responsibilities or authority granted”.
Roberts and Scapens (1985, p. 447) explained that at the heart of the accountability process
is the “giving and demanding of reasons for conduct”. Smyth (2012, p. 231) pointed out that
such definitions are “…essentially limited to the issue of answerability”, where
“accountability is framed in the context of reporting mechanisms only” and it becomes
possible to “fulfil the requirements of answerability without meeting the requirements of
accountability” (Harris and Spannier, 1976, p. 254 as cited from Smyth, 2012 p. 231).
Lindkvist and Llewellyn (2003, p. 252) highlight that often in the literature the terms
‘responsibility’ and ‘accountability’ are used interchangeably and there have been little
agreement on their definitions. In differentiating between the two terms Lindkvist and
Llewellyn (ibid) suggest that “accountability tends to connote instrumentality and external
controls, whereas responsibility to a greater extent connotes morality and inner controls”.
Similarly, Bracci explained (2009, p. 297) “felt responsibility is an internal path” (emphasis
added), which has to be accepted by someone either formally or informally, whereas,
“accountability is the external, social and public process”.
Bracci (2009) further adds another concept that of “autonomy” to accountability and
responsibility relationships. That is individual or social responsibility can only be effective
if autonomy to make decisions and solve problems is given (ibid). Thus, for an individual to
be accountable he or she “needs to be autonomous in the sense of having the possibility to
achieve the given objectives and be held responsible” (ibid, p. 297). On the other hand,
where there is autonomy without accountability, this may lead to lack of responsibility in
the organization (Bracci, 2009).
Sinclair (1995, pp. 219-20) suggested “accountability will be enhanced by recognizing
the multiple ways in which accountability is experienced”. Rather than focusing on the
“chameleon quality of its definition...to increase accountability, there is a need to understand
how it is constructed by, and extracted from, those who are held accountable” (Sinclair,
1995, p. 220). Similarly, Laughlin (2000) suggested research in accountability can only be
fully developed through a wide range of empirical case studies in different cultural settings.
This has resulted in an increase in research interests trying to theorize how accountability is
actually exercised in practice in different situations (Laughlin, 2000), as it is recognized that
accountability is socially constructed (Sinclair, 1995).
The broad literature on accountability has identified various forms of accountability
such as: formal and informal (Roberts and Scapens, 1985); contractual, administrative and
communal (Birkett, 1988); ‘individualising’ and ‘socialising’ (Roberts, 1991; 1996);
political, public, managerial, professional and personal (Sinclair, 1995); contractual and
communal (Laughlin, 1996); and hierarchical and lateral (Willmott, 1996). Therefore the
meaning of accountability is drawn from, or specific to, the context in which it is studied.
The recent literature (Gibbon, 2012; Joannides, 2012; McKernan and McPhail 2012;
McKernan, 2012; Smyth, 2012) raised the criticism that the “calculative face of
accountability has been dominant” (McKernan and McPhail 2012, p. 177), especially seen
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in the “calculative technologies of accountancy” (Miller 1992, p. 240 as cited from
McKernan and McPhail 2012), which often “hardens into exclusionary forms” (McKernan,
2012, p. 273). Accounting records are imposed by managers as the “privileged form of
account” which follows from a hierarchic form of accountability (Roberts, 1991, as cited
from Joannides, 2012, p. 246). Hence, “calculation is foundational to the production of
sovereign subjects capable of bearing responsibility and accountability” (McKernan and
McPhail 2012, p. 178). The calculative face with its quantitative practices has dominated
accountability since its inception and continues to do so (McKernan and McPhail 2012).The
accounts provide objective facts, “hard evidence, numbers that speak for themselves, no
interpretation needed, no narrative required, and the only story a “story of no story to tell”,
numbers can always be verified, even proven” (ibid, p. 179). Thus, there is no need for the
others belief as “numbers, counting, or quantification triumphs over belief” (Kamuf, 2007,
p. 252).
Bracci (2009) argues that such hierarchical accountability in organisations tend to be
similar, whereas, “lateral accountability and the type of cross-level relationships are highly
contextual” (p. 299). Gibbon (2012, p. 202) reiterates the call made by Roberts (2009) for “a
more intelligent form of accountability…one that is reflective, incoherent, socially
significant and acknowledges our interdependence whilst overcoming the preoccupation
with individualized and hierarchical accountabilities”. This accepts that accountability
cannot be understood as a “clear formal linear process of responsibility” (Gibbon, 2012, p.
201) but is “political and emotional”, “uncertain, complex and messy”, “multi-dimensional
and processual” and concludes “accountability is about our lived experience” (ibid, p. 211).
Hence, the need to pause, stop and reflect on what accountability means or could mean in a
specific context (ibid).
Joannides (2012) considers the accountability provided at the “grassroots level” (p. 244)
where there is “no guarantee that givers and demanders of accounts are in nature transparent
enough to each other to make such records eventuate and thus play their monitoring role” (p.
244). This is as accountability has its limits as highlighted by Messner (2009) where the
accountable self is “an opaque, exposed, and mediated self that is inherently limited in its
ability to give an account of itself. Because of these limits, we cannot expect demands for
accountability always to be fully met” (p. 918, emphasis added). Joannides (2012, p. 247)
reviewing Roberts (2009), Messner (2009) and McKernan (2012) concludes “accountability
emerges as an unreachable ideal” and refers to Roberts (2009) suggestion on “returning to
what one’s conscience orders would give rise to intelligent accountability” (Joannides,
2012, p. 247).
3.1 Cultural Accountability Configurations
Gelfand et al. (2004) argue that as the primary cultural dimensions influence the norms and
values of social systems, culture can be expected to impact on how society calls for
accountability to be discharged. Gelfand et al. identify three pertinent cultural dimensions:
individualism-collectivism, cultural tightness-looseness, and hierarchy-egalitarianism
(power distance). These three dimensions serve to establish a framework in which
accountability can be expected to be discharged within a society’s cultural norms. In so
doing they demonstrate that appropriate accountability is to be understood as culture
specific.
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Gelfand et al. argue that there are four basic ways in which individualistic cultures
differ from collectivistic cultures, in terms of accountability webs, i.e. cross-level
connections[10], standards of accountability and nature of reactions to breaches of conduct.
Firstly, in collectivistic cultures, an individual’s accountability is to entire groups,
“which provide much of the expectations and monitoring for norm compliance” (Gelfand et
al., p. 144). However for individualistic cultures, “accountability generally rests with
specific individuals, both for organizational successes and failures”. Secondly, there exist
differences in the number of cross-level connections. In collectivistic cultures “the group
mediates the connection to the organization for the individual” (ibid, p. 145), whereas; in
individualistic cultures “individuals primarily have connections to their immediate
supervisors through rational contracts specifying particular expectations”. Another
difference relates to “extraorganisational sources of accountability”. Expectations from
family members and the society at large that would be highly salient in collectivist cultures,
but not in individualistic cultures. Consequently, cross-level connections would be fewer in
individualistic cultures compared to collectivistic cultures.
Thirdly, the manner in which standards are communicated, perpetuated and integrated
into individual accountability webs is another way accountability in collectivistic and
individualistic culture is expected to differ (Gelfand et al., p. 146). In individualistic
cultures; there is direct communication of standards, which are formalized and explicit in
symbolic forms in the social context. However, in collectivistic cultures there is indirect
communication of standards, which “tend to be informal and implicit in the social context”
(p. 145). Gelfand et al. stress that this would mean that even though the same standard can
be applied in individualistic and collectivistic cultures, the way it would be communicated
would vary and comprehension of the standards would be dependent on an understanding of
the social context.
Finally, the differences in accountability webs for differing cultural systems will lead to
differences in reactions to breaches in codes of conduct in an organizational setting. This is
due to the differences in the type and perceptions of cross-level connections in
organizations. As such, in collectivistic cultures, the group is held responsible for any
violation to codes of conduct. In contrast, the individual is held accountable for violations of
codes of conduct, regardless of group membership in individualistic cultures.
Figure 1 provides an illustration of how an individual’s accountability web may be
understood. The figure displays the type of connections an individual may perceive to have
with the organisation, supervisor, workgroup and co-workers (Gelfand et al., 2004). Thus,
considering the “multi- and cross-level relationships” (ibid, p. 138) an individual may have
with parties in an organisation. Such connections will have an influence on the
accountability relationships between the parties concerned.
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Figure 1 Sample accountability web
Organisation
Supervisor

Co-Worker 1

Key:

Work group

Individual

Co-Worker 2

Strong connections
Weak connections

[Source: Adapted from Gelfand et al. (2004, p. 138)]
The cultural dimension of hierarchy versus egalitarianism is related to the direction of
connections in accountability webs, which can be unidirectional or bidirectional. In
hierarchical cultures, standards are predetermined, based on ascribed status and it is people
with high-power positions that set standards to be obeyed by subordinates (ibid, p.148). On
the other hand, in egalitarian cultures “standards are based on abstract principles that are
mutually adhered to by individuals, regardless of status”. Therefore, in hierarchical cultures
the direction of connections is expected to be unidirectional, whereas, in egalitarian cultures
the direction of connections is bidirectional pertaining to mutual accountability.
Gelfand et al. (p.146) referred to cultural tightness and looseness as contrasting cultural
systems relating to the degree to which “norms are clearly defined and reliably imposed”.
Hence, the nature of accountability webs within organisations of tight and loose cultures is
expected to be differentiated by virtue of the strength of the connection and the degree of
alignment of the accountability system (p. 147).
Gelfand et al. further argue that in tight cultures order and predictability are important.
There are clear social norms, which are strictly enforced with little tolerance for deviance
(ibid, p. 146). Organisations in such culture “are more likely to enact processes to ensure
expectations are delineated in policies, practices and procedures to create predictability and
order” (ibid p. 147) through explicit mechanisms in individualistic cultures or implicit
mechanisms in collectivistic cultures. Such cultures develop shared understandings of
accountability (ibid, p. 148), resulting in “more alignment in accountability webs among
individuals and their peers (horizontal alignment), individuals and their supervisors (vertical
alignment), as well as individuals within and between groups (group alignment)”.
Conversely, in loose cultures where “standards are fewer and more ambiguous” (Gelfand
et al. ibid, p. 148), behaviours are not closely monitored and there are less severe
consequences for deviance. Consequently, individuals understanding of accountability are
more likely to vary resulting in a lack of alignment between individuals and groups with
respect to accountability webs. Gelfand et al. suggest that this results in lesser predictability
and order in the organization.
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Gelfand et al. argue that in actual cultural systems the three cultural components would
exist in combination and must be simultaneously considered to understand and predict the
accountability behaviour that would exist in an organizational setting. Therefore, even
though in reality any culture can have numerous forms of accountability webs existing,
Gelfand et al. argue, a combination of the three cultural dimensions would create a
particular accountability configuration that can be expected to exist in a given social
context. Gelfand et al. consider four accountability configurations[11] that could exist in a
particular culture. These include: an individualistic, loose, and egalitarian configuration; a
collectivistic, tight, and hierarchical configuration; an individualistic, tight, and hierarchical
configuration; and a collectivistic, loose, and egalitarian configuration. The nature of these
configurations is summarised in table 1.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Interestingly enough, no prior study of accountability in developing economies makes
reference to Gelfand et al.’s (2004) work. The collectivistic, tight, hierarchical configuration
would certainly appear to be appropriate to indigenous Fijian culture (see Brison, 2001;
Brown, 2009; Davie, 2005; Durutalo, 1997; Hooper, 1982; Norton, 1992; Qalo, 1994; Qalo,
1997; Ratuva, 2005; Ravuvu, 1983; Rika et al., 2008; Seruvakula, 2000).
This study analyses the accountability of the former CEO of the Lau provincial company
to the Board and that by the former CEO and the Board to the shareholders in the context of
Gelfand et al.’s framework, comparing this with the accountability that may be expected to
be found in a Fijian social system and considers the consequences of deviance in the
accountabilities provided.
4. Research issue and methodology
Researching systems of accountability in Fiji’s provincial councils and companies is
important given the increased calls for “reinforcing transparency, fairness and
accountability” (Singh and Dakunivosa, 2001) in Fiji’s society. Review of the literature has
identified the cultural traits particular to Fiji and the appropriate accountability web
configuration as posited by Gelfand et al. (2004). This research is context specific and
reveals the accountability processes and technologies used by the Lau provincial company
under study.
As Bracci argues (2009) the use of the concept of accountability webs provides a means
of analysing accountability systems in the context of the culture in which the systems are
applied and facilitates the redesign of such systems, internal and external, formal and
informal. This avoids the cultural bias inherent in analysing accountability systems with
systems that are seen to operate successfully in other contexts. Additionally, the use of a
cultural-based approach is more effective in understanding the real functioning of
accountability in the Lau provincial company.
The present research is based on the naturalistic method of research, which utilizes an
individual case study and detailed fieldwork. Naturalistic research commences from specific
real-world situations; the main intention is to understand the systems of accountability that
the Lau provincial company practices, given the cultural context in which they operate.
Hence, the research explores the role of accountability in the context of the Lau provincial
company, rather than seeking to provide generalisable conditions for a wide segment of
society (Tompkins and Groves, 1983), in this case all provincial companies in Fiji.
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The case study research approach is appropriate as it is suited (but not exclusive) to
explanatory and exploratory studies ; the research questions relate to contemporary events,
over which the researcher has little or no control and; the case method’s unique strength lies
in its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence – documents, interviews and observations
(Yin, 2003). This illustrates the ability of the “all-encompassing method” to collect a wide
range of evidence for analysis and conclusions to be drawn (ibid).
Bracci (2009) argued that case study research is an important method for theory
construction, in the context of obtaining insights into the operation of accountability webs.
The use of the case study research method is useful as it “…considers the values, interests,
and operations of power involved – who gained, who lost, and why” (Cooper and Morgan,
2008, p. 160). It also provides deeper understanding and helps articulate and explore the
conflicts about values, interests and power in complex situations (ibid, p.164). This study
explores the role of accountability in the context of the Lau provincial company in Fiji, by
the use of an in depth case study from the periods 2009-2011.
For the purposes of this research, data was collected through content analysis of the
company’s annual general meeting minutes for the years 2006-2010, provincial council
meeting minutes for the years 2006-2010 and annual reports of the Lau provincial council
and company for the years 2006-2010, supplemented with other information in the public
domain. Additionally, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the Chief Executive
Officer on two occasions. The first interview was conducted in November 2009 and the
second follow-up interview was conducted in April 2010. Interviews were also conducted
with the newly appointed Finance Manager in July, 2011 as the company was undergoing
restructure. There were attempts to hold interviews with the Board of Directors but the
researcher was always referred to the Finance Manager to answer questions in relation to the
company. To get insights from the Lau provincial population, Tikina representatives and
provincial council officials were also interviewed during the annual provincial council
meeting in 2009. Follow-up interviews were conducted with provincial council officials
between the periods 2009-2011, recognising that the Lau Provincial Council is the
company’s largest shareholder. An interview was also held in 2009 with the iTaukei Affairs
Board (TAB) officer responsible for small business financing to indigenous owned entities.
All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed upon completion and verified with the
provincial council officials.
Furthermore, observations at annual provincial council meetings for the years 20092010 generated numerous field notes, containing a wide variety of impressions, comments
and anecdotes. These field notes provided an overall impression of the relationship between
the provincial council, the provincial population and the provincial company.
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5. Accountabilities of the Lau provincial company
The organisational structure of the Lau provincial company is illustrated below (Figure 2) to
clarify the individuals, groups, and units that are part of the company’s system of
accountability.
Figure 2 Lau Provincial Company Organisational Structure
AGM: Shareholders

Board of Directors
Board Audit & HR
Subcommittee

Board Investment
Subcommittee

Company Secretary
Chief Executive Officer (CEO)

Manager 1

Manager 2

Manager 3

Manager 4

Manager 5

(Source: Lau Provincial Company, 2010)
The accountability structure of the Lau provincial company follows from the
organisational structure of the company (Fig. 2), as confirmed in an interview with the
company’s CEO. This follows the conventional hierarchical accountability model common
to companies, however, as argued by Bracci (2009, p. 299) lateral accountability and the
types of cross-level relationships will be specific to the context. The Board of Directors
(BOD) is accountable to both A and B class shareholders of the company in the company’s
Annual General Meeting (AGM) and through the provision of the company’s annual report.
There are two Board subcommittees that are accountable to the full BOD. The company’s
CEO is directly accountable to the BOD, including the two Board subcommittees.
Therefore, the company’s main accountability document to shareholders is through the
annual report and accountability mechanisms are mainly the BOD with its subcommittees
and through the assurance[12] process.
In the company’s annual report and confirmed by the CEO in the interviews (20092010), the CEO provides the following to the BOD
•
•
•
•

Management updates
Financial updates
Business investments update
Other issues that may arise in the company
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However, in follow up interviews with the Finance Manager (Interview Transcript,
2011) it was revealed that there were shortcomings with the CEO’s accountability to the
BOD.
“…to be honest the board was given very limited information. The board requested
for financials but they were never produced, hardly given, when it was given it was
just in a nutshell no details, no analysis, so the board was quite in the dark on what
was happening.”
“…There were few questions raised but no follow-ups because at the end of the day
there was a lot of trust. If you look at this company, the first CEO of the company
upon his retirement, his own son took over as the CEO. There was a lot of trust put
on him. There was no monitoring on the activities of the CEO or on his reports to
the board.”
Therefore, the CEO had complete autonomy in preparing the reports for the BOD and
was in full control of the operations of the company.
“The previous CEO was providing weak accountabilities to the board. He provided
a good overview but he provided the overview of the company’s operations in such a
way, as not to be questioned. The board were always given financial conditions that
were always good. Therefore, the board had a difficult task on knowing what was
happening. Thus, the content of the monthly reports that were being provided were
not good for the BOD to base their decisions on. The board was in the dark on a lot
of dealings the company was doing. Such as the company decided to invest into
another company, becoming a subsidiary of the Company, when there was a need to
appoint a director for that subsidiary, the CEO nominates and appoints himself. This
creates a conflict of interest and also poor accountabilities to the BOD.” (Manager
Finance Interview Transcript, 2011)
The interview continued,“There were vague standards of accountability and the CEO decides what to report
to the board and in what format.” (Manager Finance Interview Transcript, 2011)
There is a unidirectional connection between the former CEO and the various elements
of the Board of Directors to which he is accountable. The strength of the connections can be
said to be weak, as there is little clarity in the role expectations of the CEO by the Board of
Directors. Hence, due to the high level of trust put on the former CEO and the autonomy to
make decisions in the company without being questioned, allowed him to negotiate his
accountability to the board and the shareholders of the company.
“The company owned by the provinces, the culture is such that the board hardly
questions those in power and those in power have abused it to a lot of extent...”
(Finance Manager Interview Transcript, 2011)
In the company’s BOD, traditional authority is evident. Since the establishment of the
company, the late paramount chief was the chair of the company until his demise. The late
paramount chief was the sole decision maker in the BOD and also decided who would sit on
the BOD (Interview Transcript CEO, 2009).
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“Up until 2004, being a provincial company, the BOD were selected by the late
paramount chief and he tried to ensure that the BOD were representative of the
islands of Lau.” (Interview Transcript CEO, 2009)
“For the Lau provincial company it was the case that the late paramount chief was
the sole decision maker, whereas for other provincial companies it’s operated by
groups of chiefs and qualified members of their province and decision making
become very difficult...” (Interview Transcript TAB officer, 2009)
The late paramount chief appointed the first CEO of the company, whom upon his
retirement with the approval of the late paramount chief appointed the retired CEO’s son as
the replacement CEO. In the two interview sessions conducted with the former CEO, he had
reiterated that he is mainly accountable to the chair of the company. The chair of the
company, by virtue of chiefly status effectively controls the company.
“I report to the chair of the company on a day to day basis but on a monthly basis
basically we have board meetings and I submit management reports and the various
papers that go to the board meeting… Basically, I submit reports to these two
subcommittees but reporting line is basically to the chair of the company.”
(Interview Transcript CEO, 2010)
Therefore, weak ambiguous accountability is provided to the BOD as the directors were
unable to challenge the chair of the company, neither did they have the expertise to call for
the right accountabilities.
Figure 3 Chief Executive Officer’s Accountability Web
Annual Provincial
Council meeting

Chairperson

Board of Directors

Chief Executive Officer

Tight connection
Loose connection
In contrast to the form of accountability that can be expected in an indigenous Fijian
community where cultural values of collectivism, tightness and hierarchy would generate
accountabilities to the immediate superiors, groups, the organisation and entities outside the
organisation, resulting in a high number of cross-level connections, more clear standards of
accountability and a high degree of monitoring (Gelfand et al., 2004, p. 150). The CEO
succeeded in discharging his accountability consistent with the collectivistic, loose,
hierarchical cultural configuration. The locus of accountability of the CEO is supposedly to
the BOD as specified in the company’s corporate plan[13]. However, the standards of
conduct and accountability expected of the CEO are implicit and vaguely defined. This
resulted in the CEO having full autonomy in the operations of the company with insufficient
monitoring, leading to a lack of responsibility and manipulation of reports to the BOD. In
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light of Gelfand et al., the individualistic, tight, hierarchical accountability configuration
expected to work in a typical company setting, is not effective in this context. Therefore, the
policies, processes and mechanisms in place for providing such accountability would be
ineffective, as the CEO has more of a collectivistic, loose, hierarchical cultural
configuration. This could be attributed to the fact the CEO is of mixed descent, his father an
indigenous Fijian whereas his mother is a kai valagi (i.e. a caucasian). Gelfand et al. (2004,
p. 136) argues that a cultural perspective of accountability is crucial given that individuals
from different cultures are able to understand the unique cultural configurations of
accountability specific to a particular society.
Effectively, Bracci (2009) highlighted that where there is autonomy without
accountability. This is likely to lead to lack of responsibility in the organization, as without
providing accountability, nobody was able to question his use of resources or assess the
achievement of objectives. Although there were procedures in place for the CEO to
account to the BOD there was no monitoring of the CEO’s performance or reports. This is a
result of the high level of trust placed on the CEO, which has led to the “…use of communal
forms of accountability, where expectations are left ill-defined and ex-post probity and
legality forms of reporting are likely to be accepted (if needed at all)” (Laughlin, 1996, p.
230). Consequently the accountabilities provided to the BOD were misleading.

5.1 Accountabilities provided to the Lau provincial population
Accountability is also provided to its stakeholders[14] through the annual Lau Provincial
Council meeting. The company since its inception has always provided a presentation to the
Lau Provincial Council and their presentation as mentioned by the CEO
“… is basically a financial update and then it talks about the upcoming
developments, and usually members of the provincial council have opportunity to
ask questions on how the company is progressing and some of them even give their
views on certain developments or certain proposed developments…” (Interview
Transcript CEO, 2010)
Accountability to members of the province is primarily provided by the company’s
CEO. The CEO is recognised by the Tikina representatives as the element to be held
accountable for the affairs and performance of the Lau provincial company.
“…I believe this will be the CEO, because the Chairwoman[15] it will be quite hard
to talk with her because of her status.” (Tikina Representative 1 Interview
Transcript, 2009)
“This I believe is the CEO who runs the operations of the company.” (Tikina
Representative 2 Interview Transcript, 2009)
Whereas, some Tikina representatives have a lot of respect for the company as it was
established by the late paramount chief and feel it is not their right to question the affairs of
the company. Therefore, in conducting interviews with Tikina representatives there were
instances where the Tikina representatives were hesitant to answer some of the questions
posed, especially in regards to questioning the financial affairs of the company.
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“I cannot really say anything against who is to be held accountable in the company
because our elders have always told us that the establishment of the company was by
our late high chief. He established and saw to the operations of the company, we as
members of the province are grateful for his foresight and the people who are now
running the company. The beneficiaries are the different Tikina(s) and individuals
who have invested into the company, who are given the freedom to invest their
money in their own provincial company.” (Tikina Representative 3 Interview
Transcript, 2009)
In interviews and observation of the Lau Provincial Council meeting, it was observed
that Tikina representatives just have praise for the company’s achievements. Upon
questioning of the current level of accountability received, some of the Tikina
representatives noted that they were satisfied with the current reports, whereas, some
conveyed that they were overwhelmed by the complexity of financial reports.
“I know the benefit it provides to us and to the province. The company has assets like
no other provincial company and provides a good rate of dividends we benefit from.
It is our responsibility as members of the province to invest in the company if we are
to reap the benefits.” (Tikina Representative 3 Interview Transcript, 2009)
“Yes, the financial affairs of the company are normally explained well to the
members in the meeting and we always get written reports from the company…”
(Tikina Representative 1 Interview Transcript, 2009)
“…the company discusses its affairs at the provincial council meeting; both the CEO
and Chairwoman will be there, members are happy to get clear explanations from
them regarding the operations of the company.” (Tikina Representative 2 Interview
Transcript, 2009)
“The information that is provided to us as reports from the company is normally all
aggregated together … It is in the provincial meeting that such information is
explained by the CEO, then we are able to clearly understand the information
provided…It is when we take this information to our Tikina that we face a big
problem, as this depends on the education and knowledge of the Tikina
Representative. If we the Tikina Representatives are educated and able to grasp the
financial information disclosed we are able to explain it clearly as well to our Tikina
members, otherwise than the Tikina Representative will just not be able to transmit
this information back to the Tikina in a manner for the Tikina to understand it.”
(Tikina Representative 4 Interview Transcript, 2009)
Interestingly, it is the elder members (Tikina representatives 1, 2, 3) who were satisfied
with the current level of reporting provided by the company, whereas, Tikina representative
4, a younger member openly expressed how the current system of reporting based on
accounting information was too complex.
Additionally, an interview with an official from the Trading Facility through which the
company shares can be bought and sold revealed that,“…shareholders from the province have requested the company to provide the
annual report in the Fijian language similar to that of Fijian Holdings Limited[16],
as they could not understand the complex language of the current annual report.”
(Trading Facility Officer Interview Transcript, 2011)
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Furthermore, one of the many observations made by officers of the Provincial Council was,“...our late paramount chief decided that all dividends of the Lau provincial council
from its investments in the Lau provincial company were to be reinvested in the Lau
provincial company. It was only after the death of our paramount chief that
dividends have now been used to assist in the operational costs of the provincial
council office.” (Interview Transcript Lau Provincial Council officer, 2011)
It was also found that the majority of Class A shareholders, since the inception of the
company had decided to reinvest their dividends into the company over the years in line
with the direction given by the late paramount chief. However, over the years the company
has not reflected these changes in the share capital[17] of Class A shareholders (Interview
Transcript Finance Manager, 2011). Thus it can be concluded that provincial shareholders
reinvested without knowing the terms of reinvestment, nor were they provided any real
accountability in regards to the returns on their investment and were effectively unable to
question the company due to the high power distance prevalent in this society.
The company annual reports reviewed, for the years 2007-2010, meets statutory
requirements with respect to the financials and governance. However there are no / minimal
voluntary disclosures. Such narrow, economic, hierarchical forms of accountability as
practiced by the company may actually lower any sense of responsibility towards the wider
community (Butler, 2005; Messner, 2009). Similarly, Bracci (2009) argues that
“accountability systems in organised anarchy may not find in accounting and formal
reporting the most suitable tools of control and evaluation” (p. 297).
Furthermore, the quality of accountability has been compromised to the extent that
annual reports have not been produced and AGMs are not held on a timely basis, the
company’s AGM for the year ending 31st December 2007 was held in August the following
year. For the year ending 31st December 2008 it was held in September, 2009.
Further interviews with the trading facility revealed that the company did not follow the
rules[18] of calling an AGM in 2010 to discuss 2009 financial results.
“The Lau provincial company last year announced to the public the week prior to the
AGM…however, companies must announce 21 days prior to the AGM. Hence, in the
last AGM most members from the province did not make it to the AGM. In this
year’s (2011) AGM for 2010 financial results, prior notice was given and most
representatives from the province were present to ask questions concerning the
company finances…” (Trading Facility Officer Interview Transcript, 2011)
Such poor accountabilities provided to the provincial population has important
implications, as it shows that the accountability frameworks of the company was first
developed through the founder and accepted by the Board of Directors, and further
developed by the current Chair of the company. Challenges to accountability within the
company include the traditional custom of respect and not asking questions, for “to ask a
question is to doubt” (Qalo, 1997, p. 116). Traditional authority has dominated in decisionmaking without providing the necessary accountability. As Roberts (2009, p. 362) reflected
“hierarchy seems to powerfully inhibit talk” which results in securing “the public
dominance of some opinions over others”. There has been reluctance by the board of
directors to address and expose limitations that existed in the company. As Qalo (1997)
argued this was tolerated, in order not to lose face.
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Figure 4 Accountabilities as provided to the Lau provincial population
Company AGM

Board of Directors

[Key:

Annual Provincial Council meeting

Chairperson

Chief Executive Officer

weak connections]

Accountabilities provided to the provincial shareholders of the company are through the
company’s AGM and the annual Lau provincial council meeting. Accountability provided is
limited to what is being disclosed in the company’s annual report. This is limited to
answerability, where accountability has been framed within the context of reporting
mechanisms only (Smyth, 2012). From the company’s perspective, the CEO (Interview
Transcripts 2009, 2010) has argued there is accountability where reporting is provided at the
AGM and the provincial council meeting. From observations at the Lau provincial council
meeting, the CEO would provide narrative updates to the province with the distribution of
the company’s annual report. The credibility of the oral report is sustained by reference back
to the numbers provided in the audited financial statements. Issues that cannot be addressed
in this context go unanswered. The CEO and the chair would always refer the province to
the numbers. As argued by Kamuf (2007) questioners are effectively told “Numbers do not
lie, Read the numbers, the numbers tell the story…” (p. 252), even when the numbers do not
address the issues raised.
While the Tikina representative were able to understand the CEO’s oral presentations in
the annual provincial council meeting, lacking an educational background in accounting
they were unable to understand the financial statements. Consequently they were unable to
effectively disseminate such information back to their respective districts.
Utilizing Gelfand et al.’s cultural accountability configurations (see Table 1) it can be
argued that the accountability provided to the provincial population follows a collective,
loose and hierarchical cultural accountability configuration. This is seen where the locus of
accountability is to groups, at the AGM and provincial council meeting. However, rather
than more cross-level connections as predicted for collectivistic cultures, the accountability
of the company to the provincial population has very few cross-level connections. The only
connection is the CEO and the Chair of the company to the provincial council. Exercising
the chairperson’s powerful chiefly status they are able to negotiate their accountabilities to
the province. Given that the Lau province is a hierarchical society there are unidirectional
accountability connections, hence the provincial population cannot openly challenge the
accountabilities provided by the company.
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6.

Discussion and conclusion

The province assisted the Lau provincial company financially in its formative years, by
channelling funds to it, through the copra development fund, harvest of pine plantations, the
government development assistance scheme to the provinces and provincial festivals (fund
raising activities). Such decisions were made by the late paramount chief, founder and
former chair of the provincial council and company, together with other Lauan elite, whose
judgments are considered above question in Lauan culture.
While the Lau provincial company can be considered a successful business enterprise
when compared to companies set up by other provincial councils, its financial achievements
can be best assessed by comparing its performance with that of Fijian Holdings Limited
(FHL). FHL (2012) was founded in 1984 to accelerate indigenous Fijian participation in the
economy. It operates as an investment vehicle. Its shareholders include Provincial Councils,
which were allocated shares to be paid for from initial dividends, other Fijian institutions,
Tikina and village groups, Fijian co-operatives, individual Fijians and family companies
(Fijian Holdings Limited). FHL is quoted on the South Pacific Stock Exchange restricted
list. That is to say, its shares can only be held by indigenous Fijians. A comparison of the
returns by way of dividends by the two companies is instructive.
[Insert Table 2]
The purchase price for FHL relates to the final trade of each year. The purchase price
for the Lau provincial company shares is the quotation obtained from the Kontiki
Stockbroking Limited (KSB), which offers an over the counter trading facility, however the
shares are not actively traded. Consequently comparison of capital gains/losses of the two
investments is not meaningful. From the perspective of an investor any outlay in shares in
the Lau provincial company is a sunk cost[19]. The relative attractiveness of the two
investments is reflected in their dividend yields. An investor who purchased shares in FHL
at $3.50 in 2007 would earn a superior return in all subsequent years to the return on an
investment in the Lau provincial company at $1.50. These outcomes demonstrate that the
Lau provincial council and the provincial population would have been better served by
investing in FHL rather than by persisting with their own provincial company. Given Lau is
a maritime province, the population may have looked to the provincial company to provide
shipping services, operating wharves, investment in agriculture and fishing activities,
building ice plants and the like.
Instead of operating to promote economic development in the Lau province, the
company has actually drawn resources from the province and invested them elsewhere.
Since the founder chairman’s death this includes loans made on concessionary bases to
companies operating on the mainland by certain elite Lauans, notably the founder
chairman’s / paramount chief’s family. Central government monies allocated to provide
development assistance in the province has also been redirected to the company. The
directors representing the A class shareholders all live on Fiji’s mainland, so although the
majority of ‘A’ class shareholders reside in the province, they are effectively
disenfranchised. Accountability provided to ‘A’ class shareholders residing on Fiji’s
mainland has enabled these parties to challenge the direction the company has taken, but to
date with no real success. These shareholders have however received some incidental
benefits over and above their dividend payments being able to access accommodation at the
company’s hotels at discounted prices and through living in the economy that the company
has invested in. Only since 2008 have dividends from the Lau provincial council’s
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shareholding been used to sustain its activities. With cuts in central government funding to
the provinces dividends have been channelled to sustain the provincial council’s
administration, not to financing development projects. It is impossible to escape the
conclusion that the Lau provincial company has retarded economic development in the Lau
province rather than enhanced it. Since the province only benefits through the dividend
stream, the province would be better served by investing in FHL and securing higher
returns.
This paper explores the establishment of the Lau provincial company and its systems of
accountability to the provincial population. In consequence, findings showed that the former
CEO was providing poor accountabilities to the BOD. The company had in place a formal
hierarchical accountability system typical to companies; however, cultural factors rendered
such policies, processes and mechanisms relatively ineffective, illustrating a lack of
structural alignment (Gelfand et al., 2004).
Gelfand et al. (2004) predict in line with indigenous Fijian culture a collective, tight and
hierarchical cultural accountability configuration. This would have resulted in informal and
implicit communication of standards which would be clearly understood by members. There
would be shared understandings of accountability among members of society due to the
high number of cross-level connections and a higher degree of monitoring, with severe
consequences for deviance. However, from this paper it is evident that the controlling party
of the Lau provincial company is the late paramount chief’s family. Deference shown to the
late paramount chief and his family in the interview responses on the Tikina representatives
and the willingness of communal shareholders in the province to reinvest their dividends at
the direction of the paramount chief point clearly to the fact traditional cultural values still
hold in the province. High power distance prevails. Therefore, even though indigenous
Fijian society has such cultural values as collective, tight, hierarchical, it cannot be expected
that such a corresponding cultural accountability configuration as predicted by Gelfand et
al. (2004) would hold in the context of the Lau provincial company. As a result full and
relevant accountability is not provided to the provincial population, neither would the
provincial population be able to openly challenge the accountabilities provided.
The literature shows that accountability is central to providing effective functioning
within entities, as it ensures the discharge of responsibility by those in charge (Bracci 2009;
Velayutham and Perera, 2004). The Lau provincial company’s formal system of
accountability of the company follows an individualistic/hierarchical configuration that is
accountability from the unit managers to the CEO to the board of directors to the
shareholders. It is based on agent principal relationships found in developed Western
economies. However, utilising Gelfand et al. there were weak connections found between
the CEO and the BOD; the BOD and the shareholders; the CEO and the provincial
population; and the Chair and the provincial population. The standards of accountability are
implicit and vaguely defined, permitting the CEO to negotiate the terms of the relationship
with the board, changing the nature of accountability. Additionally, the processes of
accountability in the company were implicit and there was no monitoring of the
performance and reports of the CEO. The board had a high level of trust in the CEO creating
the potential for value conflict. This is as high trust leads to the use of communal forms of
accountability where expectations are ill-defined. Consequently the CEO was not held
accountable. Ultimately this led to the dismissal of the CEO.
Utilising Gelfand et al. the cultural accountability configuration shows an
individualistic/loose/hierarchical accountability configuration resulting in the company
21

operating based on the decisions of the elite few, without being questioned on how
resources have been utilized or objectives have been achieved. Certainly some resources
have been diverted to benefit elite parties. The recent interest free loan extended to a private
company owned by the late paramount chief’s family, demonstrates that the Chair of the
Board also exercises control over accountabilities. Such a loan is noted in the financial
statements (2010) to be receivable on demand; however, because of power distance issues it
may be difficult to demand repayment of the loan. Without change in accountability
configurations the company’s failure to provide returns to its shareholders through either
distributable dividends or services may be perpetuated. Inappropriate accountabilities have
led to the company not operating towards its stated mission.
Indigenous Fijian culture, however, still influences accountability, especially the large
power distance in societies (see Davie 2005, 2007), the high levels of trust placed on those
in charge coupled with the lack of self-accountability, the culture of respect and silence, and
the lack of attention to detail and planning (Qalo, 1997) all promote weak forms of
accountability. Strong forms of accountability can be practiced by communities. This
requires explicit, unambiguous documented procedures to be established. Additionally, such
standards of performance and accountability have to be monitored with consequences for
deviance established, in order to be taken seriously. Smyth (2012) argued “the essential core
of an accountability relationship is that unless there is a form of control based on ‘reward or
sanction’ then the relationship is not one of accountability” (p. 232). Similarly, Ratuva
(2002) recommended that the economic feasibility and credibility of such indigenous owned
companies needs to be facilitated by a clearly defined system of constant monitoring and a
transparent reporting process.
Reconstructing accountabilities can impact favourably on the efficiency and
effectiveness of the provincial administration system and the commercial arms of the
provinces. If prevailing cultures impede such a transformation the Fijian administration may
be obliged to conclude that provincial development cannot be delivered by companies
established and influenced by provincial councils. While this conclusion is drawn from an
analysis of one province and its related company, it must be born in mind that all other
provincial companies have been consistently unprofitable[20].
The development companies of other provinces have all attempted to engage in their
provincial economies at some time in their operations. This offers opportunities for future
research, together with additional analysis on the cultural configuration of indigenous Fijian
societies and their corresponding accountability system. Future research can explore how
changes in indigenous Fijian societies have impacted, or failed to impact on the nature,
forms and processes of accountability. Additionally, further studies can be undertaken on
the other provincial companies to identify how cultural factors impact internal and external
accountability divergence and its effects on the efficiency and effectiveness of such
companies. It is of great importance to heed the call made by Roberts (2009) regarding the
need to explore “the possibility of our doing accountability differently” (p. 968) and
considering intelligent forms of accountability that would effectively benefit the grassroots
provincial population if provincial development companies are to fulfil their missions.
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Notes
1. That is referring to the primary cultural dimensions of ‘individualism and
collectivism’, ‘cultural tightness and looseness’, and ‘hierarchy versus
egalitarianism’.
2. The TAB is responsible for the Fijian Administration, which includes all the
provinces in Fiji.
3. A provincial council shall be made up of mata-ni-tikina(s) (Tikina representatives);
Tikina chiefs; women’s representative; youth representatives; and urban dwellers
representatives (Fijian Affairs Provincial Councils Regulations, 1996).
4. The Indo-Fijian population first came to Fiji as a result of the economic imperatives
of colonialism. This necessitated the import of indentured Indian labourers to Fiji
between the periods 1879 to 1916 to extract profit from the sugar plantations
(Ghosh, 2000).
5. Who was also prime minister of Fiji during this period.
6. Individual shareholders of the provincial company could benefit from discounted
rates when staying at the hotels.
7. These are the individuals from the Lau province who have migrated from the islands
and are now residing outside of the Lau province in the rural and urban centres of
Fiji.
8. Also referred to as the ‘Tui Nayau’, who is the paramount chief of the Lau province.
The latest holder of this title was the late Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. The successor to
this title has not been installed since the death of the late paramount chief in April,
2004. Extended vacancies of this kind are commonplace in Fiji.
9. Numerous attempts were made to interview the board of directors but the author was
referred to the former CEO and when the former CEO was relieved of his role, the
author was referred to the Finance Manager.
10. This refers to the connections between individuals and their groups, and also the
connections between these groups and the organisation as a whole (Gelfand et al.,
2004, p. 139).
11. Gelfand et al. (2004) locates eight different accountability configurations but
discusses only the above four.
12. The company since its inception continues to hire the same auditors.
13. From interviews conducted it was gathered that the CEO’s performance targets are
determined from the corporate plan of the company, which is assessed annually by
the BOD.
14. The provincial council represents the interests of the province and majority of
provincial members invest in the company through their monetary contributions to
the provincial council.
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15. The current chairperson is the daughter of the late paramount chief and also wife of
the current President of Fiji.
16. FHL (2012) was founded in 1984 to accelerate indigenous Fijian participation in the
economy. It operates as an investment vehicle. Its shareholders include Provincial
Councils, which were allocated shares to be paid for from initial dividends, other
Fijian institutions, Tikina and village groups, Fijian co-operatives, individual Fijians
and family companies. FHL is quoted on the South Pacific Stock Exchange
restricted list. That is to say, its shares can only be held by indigenous Fijians.
17. In 2009 the share register was requested for analysis by the primary researcher.
However, the CEO referred the author to Fiji’s Registrar of Companies. The
Registrar of Companies had an outdated copy, which only showed the initial
shareholdings by the provincial population.
18. Companies Law section 135(1) (a) ‘Length of notice for calling meeting’.
19. In contrast FHL is the most liquid stock traded on the SPSE.
20. One such company, Namosi Provincial Company is the subject of a separate study.
In this case serious shortcomings in accountability between the company and the
provincial population were found.
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Appendix
Table 1: Cultural accountability configurations – implications at multiple levels
Organizational level
Strength of accountability webs

Example of
cultural
configurations

Locus of
Accountability

Individualistic,
loose, egalitarian

The self and peers
/ Supervisor

Explicit

Low

Few

Low

Low

Low

Collectivistic,
tight, hierarchical

The immediate
supervisor, group,
the organization
and entities
outside the
organization (e.g.,
families)

Implicit

High

More

High

High

High

Individualistic,
tight, hierarchical

Self, superior, and
the organization

Explicit

Moderate

More

High

High

High

Collectivistic,
loose, egalitarian

The group and
entities outside
the organization
(e.g., families)

Implicit

Moderate

Fewer

Low

Low

Low

Standards
(explicit or
implicit)

Number of crosslevel connections

1. No. of standards
2. Clarity of standards
3. Degree of monitoring
1.
2.
3.

Overall alignment within
the organisational system
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Interpersonal/group context and individual level
Example cultural
configurations

Amount of role
sending

Nature of
role sending

Degree of
role conflict

Felt
responsibility
to external
standards

Individualistic,
loose, egalitarian

High

Greater role
making

High

Low

High

Low

Collectivistic, tight,
hierarchical

Low

Greater role
taking

Low

High

Low

High

Individualistic,
tight, hierarchical

Low

Greater role
taking

Low

Moderate

High

Moderate

Collectivistic, loose,
egalitarian

High

Greater role
making

High

Moderate

Low

Moderate

Amount of
self-accountability

Strength of
reactions to
violations of
standards

Source: Gelfand et al. (2004, p. 150)
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Table 2: Comparative analysis of Lau Provincial Company (LPC) and FHL - Dividends
2007-2010
Year

Company

Purchase price
per share

Dividend per
share

Dividend yield

2007

LPC
FHL

$1.50
$3.50

$0.10
$0.3911

6.7%
11.2%

2008

LPC
FHL

$1.90
$2.16

$0.10
$0.3911

5.3%
18.1%

2009

LPC
FHL

$1.90
$2.79

$0.05
$0.6823

2.6%
24.5%

2010

LPC
FHL

$1.90
$3.22

$0.10
$0.4389

5.3%
13.6%

Source: LPC annual reports and the South Pacific Stock Exchange
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